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ABSTRACT 
 The United States power grid is a logical target for a major cyber attack because it 
connects all of the nation’s critical infrastructures with electricity. Attackers consistently 
exploit vulnerabilities of the bulk power system and are close to being able to disrupt 
electrical distribution. We live in a world that is interconnected, from personal online 
banking to government infrastructure; consequently, network security and defense are 
needed to safeguard the digital information and controls for these systems. The cyber 
attack topic has developed into a national interest because high-profile network breaches 
have introduced fear that computer network hacks and other security-related attacks have 
the potential to jeopardize the integrity of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The national 
and economic security of the United States depends on a reliable, functioning critical 
infrastructure. A comprehensive understanding of the effects of a massive power failure 
may help promote changes in the way cyber security is run on our most important critical 
infrastructure: the national power grid. This study investigates the robustness of the 
power grid’s network system, the collaboration between public and private sectors 
against cyber threats, and mitigation requirements in areas of weakened controls such as 
program planning and management, access controls, application software development, 
and system software and service continuity controls. 
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I. ENHANCING ELECTRICAL GRID CYBER SECURITY 
 The United States’ power grid is a logical target for a major cyber-attack because 
it connects all the nation’s critical infrastructures with electricity. Attackers consistently 
exploit vulnerabilities of the bulk power system and are close to being able to disrupt 
electrical distribution system. How can the United States better protect its cyber networks 
to prevent an attack on the electrical grid by aggressive and dangerous hackers? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
We live in a world that is interconnected, from personal online banking to 
government infrastructure, which consequently requires network security and defense to 
safeguard the digital information and controls for these systems. The cyber-attack topic has 
developed into a national interest because high-profile network breaches have created fear 
that computer network hacks and other security related attacks have the potential to 
jeopardize the integrity of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The United States requires a 
functional and resolute critical infrastructure to cultivate its economic and political 
strength.1 
The most important asset within the nation’s 16 critical infrastructure lineup is the 
national power grid. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) refers to the energy 
sector as the “backbone of our nation’s economy, security, and health.”2 Without electrical 
power, just about everything from emergency services equipment to residential lighting, in 
our information-age reliant society will not work.3 Parts of the U.S. electrical network are 
aging past a century, comprised of power plants averaging 30 years old. The massive and 
outdated electrical grid is a sprawling machine constructed of millions of equipment pieces, 
                                                 
1 “Reducing Cyber Risk to Critical Infrastructure: NIST Framework Department of Energy,” 
Department of Energy, accessed August 25, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/oe/cybersecurity-critical-
energy-infrastructure/reducing-cyber-risk-critical-infrastructure-nist. 
2 “What Is Critical Infrastructure?” Department of Homeland Security, accessed December 7, 2017, 
https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure. 
3 Sans Institute, “Can Hackers Turn Your Lights Off? The Vulnerability of the U.S. Power Grid to 
Electronic Attack,” (Institute InfoSec Reading Room, SANS Institute, 2001), https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/hackers/hackers-turn-lights-off-vulnerability-power-grid-electronic-attack-606. 
2 
many that require replacement or overhaul.4 Obsolete equipment that are now 
interconnected to complex automated systems have the potential to leave an entire 
electrical grid vulnerable to hackers. If hackers were to remotely shut off decrepit but 
critical electrical transformers at three strategically located substations in the Northeastern 
part of the United States during a winter when energy demand peaks, power would likely 
have to be routed from nearby states.5 The intentional act of shutting off important 
electrical transmission and distribution equipment can cause a domino effect by creating 
cascading power outages across multiples cities or states. 
Rogue actors attempt to gain information on U.S. stealth aircraft, GPS satellites, 
and military operations. It would be irresponsible to assume they are not showing the same 
interest in the United States’ critical energy infrastructure. People in developed countries 
tend to take the value of electricity for granted because it is something that is expected to 
work. “Despite its great importance in our daily lives, most of us rarely stop to think what 
life would be without electricity,” and the interdependencies it has on other critical 
infrastructures, like powering the pumps in the potable water system or powering the heavy 
machinery that extracts natural gas from the Earth’s surface.6 Although the potential 
repercussions of an attack on the electrical grid are severe, most people do not consider 
this issue pressing because there is no precedent of an irreparable failure. However, the 
emergence of innovative and rapidly evolving threats as the nation moves to complex 
automated networked systems is enough reason to be wary. 
To provide a glimpse of what a mass electrical outage can cause, in September 2011 
approximately five million electrical customers throughout the Southwest United States 
and parts of Northern Mexico on a hot summer weekday had their daily routine interrupted 
at precisely 3:38 pm PST. Trains stopped, freeways and roads were gridlocked without any 
                                                 
4 Katie Bo Williams and Cory Bennett, “Why a Power Grid Attack Is a Nightmare Scenario,” The Hill, 
last modified June 30, 2016, http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/281494-why-a-power-grid-attack-is-a-
nightmare-scenario. 
5 Harold Shapiro, America’s Energy Future (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2009), 
256, https://www.nap.edu/read/12091/chapter/1#ii. 
6 Mary Bellis, “What Is Electricity?” ThoughtCo, last modified February 28, 2018, 
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-electricity-4019643. 
3 
working traffic signals, courts and universities shut down for the day, water supplies 
became contaminated, and emergency services and hospitals ran on limited generator 
power. Though the cause was not a deliberate act, the widespread blackout continued until 
the next morning, leaving multiple geographic regions in complete darkness throughout 
the evening. Power to the San Diego metropolitan area was out for close to a day; although 
the major result was inconvenience, a deliberate lengthy and widespread outage could have 
many more severe and even deadly consequences. 
The power grid has been physically susceptible for decades. We have just recently 
begun to recognize and comprehend the gravity of an evolving hazard to the power grid’s 
cyber security framework. As the power grid becomes more reliant on data sharing and 
computers, it can respond to the fluctuations in power demands and link a variety of energy 
sources together. However, there is a high potential that the automated functions used in 
these grids could be manipulated by hackers who manage to break into the electrical grid 
computer systems.7 The United States cannot have a normally functioning society without 
a resilient cyber security program protecting our nation’s power grid. Without linking the 
grid to an operable and safe network, it will continue to be vulnerable to disruptions.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the modern world has transferred from an analog to a digital mode of 
operating critical infrastructure.8 The shift in technology has brought out new hazards and 
threats provoking intellectual discussions among energy sector think tanks, subject matter 
experts (SME), and scholars. These widespread discussions have led to a myriad of ideas, 
new and enhanced practices and standards, and sparked hypothetical scenarios and their 
consequences that were not possible just a few decades ago.9 This literature review will 
                                                 
7 Manimaran Govindarasu and Adam Hahn, “Cybersecurity of the Power Grid: A Growing 
Challenge,” U.S. News and World Report, last modified February 24, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/
news/national-news/articles/2017-02-24/cybersecurity-of-the-power-grid-a-growing-challenge. 
8 “Consulting for Critical Infrastructure,” Cytek, accessed August 27, 2018, https://www.cytek.com/
consulting-for-critical-infrastructure/. 
9Aranyaand Chakrabortty et al., Digital Grid: Transforming the Electric Power Grid into an 
Innovation Engine for the United States, arXiv:1705.01925 (North Carolina: North Carolina State 
University, 2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.01925. 
4 
examine literature pertinent to cyber security safeguards in the energy sector. This thesis 
will delineate the critical infrastructure of the energy sector into three fundamental cyber 
security elements: (1) security system robustness; (2) joint public and private collaboration; 
(3) available options to mitigate risk. 
1. Cyber Security Robustness 
The prolific data breaches in recent months and the exhaustive efforts by cyber 
security professionals to stop them is a stark reminder to have a robust cyber security 
system. The Director of National Intelligence stated in 2009 testimony before the Congress, 
“the growing connectivity between information systems, the internet, and other 
infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, energy 
pipelines, financial networks, and electrical power.”10 High-tech information technology 
(IT) systems, with the direct involvement of operators, regulate the U.S. power grid’s entire 
electrical production process from generation, transmission, and distribution, most 
commonly referred to as industrial control systems (ICS).11 The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) defines industrial control systems as “combinations of 
control components that act together to achieve an industrial objective.”12 The United 
States’ critical infrastructure is heavily reliant on ICS to manage utility industrial 
operation.13 It is just as important to defend industrial control systems as it is to protect the 
physical assets in the power grid. 
                                                 
10 Examining the Cyber Threat to Critical Infrastructure and the American Economy: Hearing Before 
the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee 
on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, 112th Cong. 1 (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-112hhrg72221/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72221.pdf. 
11 “Industrial Control System,” Trend Micro USA, accessed August 25, 2018, 
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/industrial-control-system. 
12 “Industrial Control System,” CSRC, accessed August 25, 2018, https://csrc.nist.gov/
Glossary/?term=4752. 
13 Lendvay, Ronald, “Shadows of Stuxnet: Recommendations for U.S. Policy on Critical 
Infrastructure Cyber Defense Derived from the Stuxnet Attack” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2016), 138, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48548/
16Mar_Lendvay_Ronald.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
5 
The nations outermost cyber security defenses are no match to hackers. A 2014 
report released by the Committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs revealed 
figures that clearly show the federal government’s inability to successfully mitigate the 
48,000 times government systems were targeted that year.14 The statistics are more 
concerning in the privately-owned electrical utility realm with only 40 percent of all cyber-
attacks ever being discovered, with even less of those publicly disclosed.15 If laws or moral 
obligation do not require companies to reveal they have been hacked, they most likely will 
not; revealing flawed information that can smear a company’s reputation is bad business 
that will ward off customers. This ultimately creates an uninformed public and hinders the 
success rate for solutions. The holes that allow penetration into the system are often the 
result of outdated software and failures to install updated programs and/or patches. These 
types of controllable shortcomings pose a great risk to our power grid critical infrastructure.  
Adversaries, without a doubt, have infiltrated the woefully insecure networks and 
systems that manage industrial equipment that keep our lights on. However, the United 
States is not yet on the verge of declaring our first cyber-war, which could result in 
blackouts, mass chaos, and cascading effects to other critical infrastructures.16 Sandworm, 
a Russian-connected computer hacking group, was responsible for the December 2015 
Kiev, Ukraine, blackout--the first of its kind in the world because it was a cyber-attack 
induced outage.17 The antagonists deliberately conducted a similar attack, taking down a 
transmission station, the following year. The hacker’s actions were sophisticated, which 
demonstrated they had comprehensive information about the electrical grid’s management 
system and how to manipulate it.18 
                                                 
14 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center Act, 113th Cong (2014), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113th-congress/senate-report/240/1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 James Zirin, “Are We on the Brink of a Cyber-War?” Huffington Post, last modified April 26, 
2010, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-d-zirin/are-we-on-the-brink-of-a_b_475237.html. 
17 Andrea Peterson, “Hackers Caused a Blackout for the First Time, Researchers Say,” The 





Some scholars caution against comparing Ukraine’s Soviet era power grid to 
the United States’ behemoth of interconnected systems that make up its power grid, 
because “America’s power grid infrastructure is substantially more complex than 
Ukraine’s.”19 Assuming the cyber-attacks in Ukraine is an impossible scenario in the 
United States is far-fetched, but it would certainly pose a prodigious challenge to those 
who dare. The U.S. power grid is an intricate web comprised of hundreds of electric 
utility companies, all with the same objective to produce power and provide it to their 
customers.20 Electrical companies manage electricity in their own geographical 
locations; though separate entities, each are interconnected via power lines, 
transmission systems, generation facilities, and systems that reduce the possibility of 
a blackout and mitigate the aftermath in the event of a blackout.21 Hurricanes Harvey 
and Katrina are evidence of the tenacity of the electrical grids’ employees to restore 
power in a practical amount of time after catastrophic events.22 Cyber security 
professionals can learn to respond to cyber-attacks with the identical steadfast 
dedication that emergency responders put forth during restoration efforts after a 
natural disaster. Additionally, while it is challenging to successfully take a few menial 
pieces of equipment offline, it is exponentially more arduous to shut down all 
operations of an entire electrical company let alone a multitude of them.23 
                                                 
19 Robert Lee and Sergio Caltagirone, “Dragonfly 2.0: Hackers Don’t Control America’s Power 
Grid,” Fortune, last modified September 11, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/09/11/dragonfly-2-0-symantec-
hackers-power-grid/. 
20 “United States Utility Company List by State,” BEST, accessed August 27, 2018, 
http://www.bestenergynews.com/solar/utility_co/utility_companies.php. 
21 “U.S. Electric System Is Made up of Interconnections and Balancing Authorities,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA),” last modified July 20, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=27152. 
22 “UPDATED: Electric Utilities Make Headway on Harvey Outage Restorations,” Electric Light and 




2. Public and Private Sector Collaboration 
If the public and private electric companies collaborate with one another, they will 
have an advantage over cyber threats and will have the capacity to defend against them.24 
About 85 percent of the United States’ energy infrastructure is owned and operated by the 
private sector; however, the entire sector, including entities run by the government, face 
the same challenges against cyber threats.25 Therefore, company stakeholders must 
understand that it is imperative to have a robust cyber security program to prevent probable 
threats. The government and privately-owned companies have their own strengths and 
weaknesses to combatting cyber criminals. For example, the U.S. government has far more 
resources than their private counterparts to determine the origin of an attack. The federal 
government has working relationships with law enforcement agencies with large databases, 
they have the means and authority to analyze foreign intelligence, and access to their own 
highly sensitive systems that no private utility could ever have access to.26 For these 
reasons, the public sector is “better positioned to investigate and prosecute cyber 
criminals.”27 
The country’s health and welfare depend on a well-guarded and resilient critical 
infrastructure made up of the most vital physical and cyber assets. “The National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) established a partner framework that enables federal, 
state, regional, local, tribal, territorial, and international governments to collaborate among 
their private sector associates.”28 According to DHS, this partner framework improves all 
aspects of infrastructure from development and communication to risk assessment and 
                                                 
24 Arnav Jagasia, “A Look into Public Private Partnerships for Cybersecurity,” Public Policy, last 
modified April 18, 2017, https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/1815-a-look-into-public-
private-partnerships-for. 
25 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Critical Infrastructure Long-Term Trends and Drivers 




28 Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013 Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 




response.29 A partnership of all energy sector stakeholders will make implementing cyber 
security and resilience activities throughout the country seamless yet robust. 
3. Mitigating Options 
Modern electrical systems are built to operate in the most extreme weather 
environments and are able to quickly restore to normal operations after gale force winds, 
raging wildfires, lightning strikes, snow storms, and a variety of system failures. 30 Apart 
from the standard features incorporated into the electrical systems physical design, which 
withstand the wrath of mother nature, they are also built with sophisticated technological 
safeguards to protect against unpredictable actors.31 Just as the methods and techniques of 
modern hackers evolve, so must the protections and responses of the systems evolve. 
If the United States fell victim to an attack similar to the level of sophistication used 
in the Ukraine cyber-attack, the capability to operate the power grid in a manual state 
without the digital overlay and automated controls would be difficult, but achievable.32 In 
addition, to prepare for a cyber-attack, the United States electricity sector participates in 
the largest biennial power grid security exercise called GridEx, which is “designed to 
execute the electricity sector’s crisis response to simulated coordinated cyber security and 
physical security threats and incidents, to strengthen utilities’ crisis response functions, and 
to provide input for lessons learned.”33 
Lastly, the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015 is designed to defend our 
national energy grid from terrorist cyber-attacks. The bipartisan act supported by both 
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid is proof 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 James Zucchetto, Terrorism and the Electric Power Delivery System (Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, 2012), 55, https://www.nap.edu/read/12050/chapter/8. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Robert Knake, “A Cyberattack on the U.S. Power Grid,” Council on Foreign Relations, last 
modified April 3, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid. 
33 “GridEx III Showcases Steady Improvements on Participation, Coordination,” Transmission & 
Distribution World, last modified April 4, 2016, https://www.tdworld.com/transmission/gridex-iii-
showcases-steady-improvements-participation-coordination. 
9 
of the United States’ determination to keep hackers away from our power grid.34 The Act 
provides faster and more effective responses when threats arise, authorizes additional cyber 
security research, and erects stronger cyber security defenses. Additionally, the bill grants 
the energy secretary emergency authority in the event of a cyber-attack on the electrical 
grid. If the United States can manage to mitigate the aftermath of a cyber-attack, the nation 
will position itself to be able to seamlessly restore power. However, the Act falls short of 
an actual true energy reform by continuing and expanding the government knows best 
model, which has a history of failure. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The following elements will be discussed in the chapters that follow because of 
their importance to cyber security safeguards. The first element is the robustness of the 
power grid’s network systems that requires improvement. The number of cyber-attack 
related cases targeting all U.S. critical infrastructures and their industrial systems have 
surged since 2010.35 Per a 2015 report produced by Department of Homeland Security 
Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), the energy 
sector faced a grueling 20 percent spike in targeted attacks in under a decade.36 
The second element of collaboration between the public and private sectors also 
requires improvement. Cyber-attacks are inevitable, but the nation will continue to use 
computerized systems. Even with the obvious cyber and physical security threats to U.S. 
critical infrastructure, there is an indistinct divide in the working relationship between the 
private and public sectors.37 A massive proportion of the energy sector and assets 
                                                 
34 Energy Policy Modernization Act, 114th Cong. (2015) https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/
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(February 2015): 56, Public Services International, http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/
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important to national security are owned and operated by private organizations.38 
Accordingly, due to the great influence private organizations have in the electrical sector, 
they must “promote cooperation among public and private entities that cultivates cohesive, 
interdependent agreements and communication, which is crucial to preserving critical 
infrastructure security and resilience.”39 
The third element of mitigation need improvement largely due to weakened 
computer control system vulnerabilities. The weakened controls include “entity wide 
security program planning and management, access controls, application software 
development and change controls, and segregation of duties, system software controls, and 
service continuity controls.”40 
To better protect our cyber infrastructure to prevent a major power grid attack, three 
things must be done: there must be a higher level of situational awareness against 
adversarial threats, tougher security standards and measures must be in place to combat 
cyber threats and vulnerabilities, and lessons applied from analysis of malicious physical 
and cyber security incidents against the electrical grid. 
It will never be an easy task to defend the American power grid from cyber-attacks 
because of the size and scope of the grid.41 Chris Martin and Will Wade claim the grid is 
composed of a myriad of computerized and physical equipment linking almost all standing 
structures in the United States. Additionally, because the electrical grid must continually 
be operational, providing the exact quantity of electricity where it is needed during every 
second of the day means it is something that cannot be taken offline to repair or upgrade 
for extended periods of time. The pace of the technology used to operate the equipment is 
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developing more rapidly than the grid infrastructure itself, making it challenging to meet 
security standards. 
A vast area that needs attention is cyber security literacy. Many cyber security 
breaches can be traced to phishing attacks, in which corporate employees click on fake 
links to allow hackers to install malware on their computer network. Many government 
and private employees access sensitive servers every day and these people may have 
insufficient training on how to protect the network they are using. Regardless how much 
security administrators strengthen a network, it can all be brought down by network users 
inadvertently clicking on a link from an unknown sender. 
Security standards allow power utility companies to properly safeguard their assets. 
“The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which oversees the grid in 
the United States and Canada, has rules known as Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
compliance, for how electric companies are required to protect power grid both physically 
and electronically.”42 These set of rules and requirements are intended to provide a 
standard for electrical grid asset monitoring and to provide guidance on how to defend the 
valuable equipment in the nations bulk electric system.43 
Additionally, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
provides companies with additional guidelines on cyber protection, which has proven to 
boost security measures at high-voltage transmission sites and power generation 
facilities.44 In contrast, Manimaran Govindarasu and Adam Hahn in their article 
“Cybersecurity of the Power Grid: A Growing Challenge,” claim the NIST guidelines 
minimally impact the cyber and physical security for low-voltage distribution sites that 
serve to provide electricity to the end customer. Statistically, cyber-attacks against low-
voltage systems account far fewer than those against high-voltage systems found in a power 
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plant.45 Protecting the borders of any power distribution facility is often more difficult than 
defending the middle of it because multiple companies become involved with daily 
operations, networking together different systems, adding more physical locations to 
protect.46 
According to Symantec, within the last year a complex and highly organized 
hacking group known as Dragonfly penetrated multiple U.S. power companies, and the 
group most likely had the opportunity to sabotage electrical production and distribution.47 
The unrestricted access to the power grid would could have knocked power out to 
customers for days. It is not known for certain why the perpetrators did not conduct any 
further action. Symantec believes it might have been a proof of concept attack or a political 
statement to prove to the United States government and agencies in charge of the security 
for industrial control networks that hackers have the capability to access what they want 
and when they want to.48 One thing for sure is cyber-security measures need to drastically 
change. 
Though there have been more frequent and increasingly sophisticated cyber 
security events targeting the United States electrical sector, these actions have been largely 
unsuccessful so far. These cyber-attacks have been simple or crude causing minimal or no 
outages. While no events have been catastrophic, they make the vulnerabilities of the power 
grid clearer, that there is potential for more significant damage. The lessons learned from 
these events will be to harden security systems, advocate for grid modernization, and foster 
new approaches to increase cyber security to prevent a perilous attack. 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis assesses the empirical evidence for each of the three elements of 
robustness, collaboration, and mitigation of cyber security employed in the power grid. It 
uses comparative case studies of the Ukraine power grid attacks in 2015 and 2016 as well 
as the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign, which has targeted the United States, Switzerland, and 
Turkey. It also uses statistical analysis on the number of successful intrusions and attacks 
against United States energy service provider companies. Case studies and statistical 
analysis through the review of published literature are the primary approaches to answer 
my research question as these are the most appropriate to provide the best evidence to make 
a causal argument. The purpose of this thesis is not to infer or speculate who the primary 
cyber threat actors are but rather to focus on how cyber security in an electrical grid is 
applied, how it is exploited when the electrical grid is not adequately protected, and 
recommended approaches to better strengthen the barriers within the energy critical 
infrastructure. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This first chapter serves as an introduction to provide the reader with the problem 
description of the energy sectors susceptibility to hacking and a broad overview of three 
primary elements of robustness, collaboration, and mitigation. The second chapter will 
provide in detail power grid vulnerabilities that can be exploited through real world case 
studies. The third chapter will review the power grids critical infrastructure management 
and give an overview of the defense in depth security architecture and its strategy elements. 
The fourth chapter will assess the public and private electrical sectors collaboration of 
cyber security practices and standards and the existing landscape for electrical grid cyber 
security governance. This chapter will discuss the collaboration between the public 
industry and the United States government and the standards, guidelines, and practices they 
promote to protect the energy sectors computer network. The fifth chapter will delve into 
the challenges within specific areas of vulnerability in the power grid control centers, 
substations, and communication centers. It will also discuss safeguard measures that are 
currently in place and the technologies and actions that help mitigate the impact of a 
14 
potential cyber-attack. The sixth chapter will conclude the thesis by identification of the 
challenges the energy sector faces when implementing power grid safeguards, the public 
and private pre-planned responses, and possible lessons to improve cyber security. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER-ATTACKS ON THE UKRAINIAN 
AND WESTERN ENERGY SECTORS 
Espionage is not a new concept. Since there have been enemies, the role of 
espionage played out in warfare has meant the difference between winning and losing. 
Espionage in the modern era has taken a new turn involving armies of nefarious computer 
hackers. These cyber crooks use their technical expertise to gain military, political, or 
economical advantage. Russia is one of the most infamous state sponsors for large-scale 
cyber-attacks and their training ground to conduct cyber espionage and cyber-attacks have 
been in their neighboring country Ukraine. The following case studies will exhibit Russia’s 
cyber might and identify how it is using its proxies for non-linear strategic cyber-attacks 
in the east that will have long term consequences in the west.  
A. CYBERWAR ON UKRAINE’S POWER GRID 
It sometimes seems like any network connected to the internet, including those in 
at an electrical plant are swarming with hackers attempting to gain unauthorized access.49 
Russian hackers have obtained hands-on access to utility control systems in the United 
States and abroad.50 Andy Greenberg’s 2017 article “How Power Grid Hacks Work, and 
When You Should Panic” undoubtedly indicates that although cyber-attack dangers are 
real and continue to happen regardless of endless cyber security update measures. 
Greenberg claims that there is no need to sound the alarm for every attempted power grid 
penetration. Giving each attempted attack and responding to them all with equal attention 
would be equivalent to treating every convenience store shoplifter as they were an unstable 
and precarious leader with access to a nuclear arsenal.51 A breach to a power grid can range 
from a typical malware infection to months or years of nation-state funded 
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reconnaissance.52 These types of incidents can have drastically dissimilar consequences, 
ranging from meager personal information acquisition to a cascading infrastructure 
catastrophe. The event that occurred in Ukraine characterizes the aftermath of the latter. 
On December 23, 2015, Ukrainian Kyivoblenergo, an electricity distribution 
company specializing in electrical transmission and supply, announced service disruptions 
to its customers.53 Power outages are common during harsh winter times in former USSR 
countries because outdated equipment can struggle with electrical demands, when 
customers lost power, there was no immediate reason to suspect unusual circumstances 
surrounding this outage. However, it came to light that something was exceptionally 
different about this outage because customers did not lose power from severe weather event 
or aging equipment that failed. Disruptions had occurred because of a third party’s illegal 
entry into Kyivoblenergo’s mainframe and remote networks through cyber-enabled 
backdoors. The Kyivoblenergo power grid is managed by control stations that are 
connected to substations, switches, and sensor in arrangements termed supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. For approximately three hours, seven 110 kV and 
23 35 kV substations were remotely disengaged. The cyber-attack put other parts of the 
distribution grid to a halt, which forced Kyivoblenergo employees to switch to manual 
mode, and restored power using Soviet-era manual controls.54 Despite restoration to the 
three affected substations, Kyivoblenergo continued to run under constrained operations. 
Kyivoblenergo’s initial estimates put the affected total customers at around 80,000, 
but after the realization that two other companies were also attacked updated estimates 
brought the affected total to 225,000 customers that lost power throughout the region.55 
Not long following the cyber-attack, Ukrainian government officials held Russian security 
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53 Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), Analysis of the Cyber-attack on the 
Ukrainian Power Grid (Washington, DC: E-ISAC, 2016), https://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/
Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf. 
54 Peter Behr and Blake Sobczak, “Utilities Look Back to the Future for Hands-on Cyberdefense,” 
E&E News, last modified July 21, 2016, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060040590. 
55 Pavel Polityuk, Oleg Vukmanovic, and Stephen Jewkes, “Ukraine’s Power Outage Was a Cyber-
attack: Ukrenergo,” Reuters, last modified January 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-
cyber-attack-energy/kiev-power-outage-in-december-was-cyber-attack-ukrenergo-idUSKBN1521BA. 
17 
services accountable for the outages.56 As a result of the allegations against the Russian 
Federation, “investigators in Ukraine, as well as private companies and the U.S. 
government, performed analysis and offered assistance to determine the root cause of the 
outage.”57 The Ukrainian power grid attacks became the first publicly acknowledged 
power outage as a result from a cyber-attack.58 
1. The Final Stages of the Cyber-Attack 
The cyber-attack was carefully coordinated and synchronized, most likely because 
of extensive reconnaissance and exploitation of the vulnerable Ukrainian networks. An 
investigation revealed that the cyber-attacks, which disrupted power to several regional and 
central sites, happened approximately 30 minutes apart from each other.59 As reported by 
the Department of Homeland Security, remote operation of the breakers could have been 
managed a couple ways by the external hackers: using bundled administrative SCADA 
software pre-installed from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or via a virtual 
private network (VPN) that allows a remote encrypted connection from a hackers computer 
to manipulate the controls of another computer over the internet.60 However, the Escal 
Institute of Advanced Technologies investigation, a for-profit company that provides 
training in cyber and information security, found that the rogue players attained genuine 
credentials from electrical plant employees months before the cyber-attack to assist with 
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gaining remote access.61 The cyber weapons used or the hackers’ comprehensive 
knowledge about the power grid was not their key asset, it was their ability to perform long 
term surveillance on several central facilities leading to the use of a multiple phased plan 
of attack. 
Investigations confirmed that during the final stages of the industrial sabotage, the 
hackers initiated the KillDisk wiper malware on network drives that hindered or 
permanently disabled Ukrainian power grid equipment that is essential to run the facilities 
that serve its customers.62 “The KillDisk software is a type of malware that deletes 
particular files on target systems as well as corrupts the master boot record, the first sector 
of any hard disk that identifies where and how an operating system is located in order for 
it to load, thus incapacitating the system it hijacks.”63 Additionally, the hackers 
maliciously corrupted the firmware of certain Serial-to-Ethernet converters at select 
substations, making them inoperable.64 These tiny boxes in the substations have the job of 
translating internet protocols to communicate with older equipment.65 Furthermore, to 
hinder the Ukrainians from executing emergency action plans for incident response and 
restoration, the hackers remotely disconnected uninterruptable power supplies (UPS) to 
two of the electrical companies control centers that provide emergency backup power in 
the event primary power is lost.66 These critical pieces of equipment that are supposed to 
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provide near instantaneous emergency power to equipment when the main input power 
source fails were reconfigured to power off instead of power on. 
2. BlackEnergy Malware 
Kyivoblenergo also claimed that they had been infected with BlackEnergy, a Trojan 
used to initially conduct cyber espionage, setting forth the path for denial-of-service (DoS) 
and information destruction attacks.67 The cyber espionage allowed hackers to illicitly 
acquire login credentials that enabled them to remotely manipulate the power grid. The 
hackers targeted electric company employees who serve Ukraine’s 24 geographical regions 
with a variety of administrative accesses using an email spoofing tactic called spear 
phishing. 68 Kim Zetter,, in her article “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of 
Ukraine’s Power Grid,” asserts that when the Word documents were delivered in emails, 
and the unbeknownst victim opened and accepted an ‘Enable Macros’ popup request, a 
backdoor to the system opened. Neither BlackEnergy nor KillDisk encompassed the 
mechanisms used to deliberately cause an outage. However, the codes were used to attack 
and delay restoration efforts, respectively. 
B. CYBERWAR ON THE WESTERN POWER GRID 
Symantec, an American software company that provides cyber security software 
and services, has recently detected a strikingly new trend of cyber-attacks aimed at energy 
sector organizations.69 The infamous Dragonfly organization, also known as Energetic 
Bear, has been the driving force behind the cyber-attacks targeting the western power grid. 
The Dragonfly organization is confirmed to be operating since at least 2011 when attackers 
aimed their campaign at the United States and Canadian aviation and defense companies. 
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Initial Dragonfly operations seemed to be for exploration, scouting, and sophisticated cyber 
espionage campaigns. They evolved into Dragonfly 2.0 where its operations progressed 
into positioning for destructive activities.70 Dragonfly’s objective shifted from 
reconnaissance to digital invasion by gaining access to energy facility operational systems. 
The posture change may indicate Dragonfly’s motive may be shifting from intelligence 
collection to industrial sabotage.71 
It was in 2013 that Dragonfly had begun another stage in their attacks, 
concentrating on United States’ and European energy companies. Dragonfly scaled back 
operations in 2014 when they were detected by Symantec but reemerged in December 
2015. A new wave of attacks began with the sending of malicious emails masked as a New 
Year’s Eve party invitation to energy sector targets, according to Symantec.72 
1. Dragonfly 2.0 Targets Energy Sector Gaining Access to SCADA 
Systems 
The attack campaign continued in 2017 with sustained phishing, typically with 
Microsoft Word documents disguised as a resume or report attached to emails. 
Unbeknownst to company employees, the attachments contained a template injection 
attack, a silent way to harvest network credentials using the server message block (SMB) 
protocol. According to TechTarget, a digital marketing company, defines SMB protocol as 
“a client-server communication protocol used for sharing access to serial ports, printers, 
files and other resources on a network.”73 The malicious documents did not rely on 
traditional methods such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA), the programming 
language for Microsoft Office software suite, or a list of executable commands used to 
spread the malicious software.74 Instead, the email attachment uploads a service request 
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file through an SMB portal to collect an unsuspecting computer user’s authentication 
information.75 
2. Backdoor.Dorshel and Backdoor.Goodor Malware 
With the illegally acquired credentials, hackers were able to conduct follow-up 
attacks against targeted organizations. They used a variety of techniques to install 
Backdoor.Dorshel or Backdoor.Goodor malware that allowed remote access to computer 
terminals.76 Attackers with unrestricted remote access were able to chart their targeted 
domain and systems as well as increase their administrative rights, which allowed them to 
connect to industrial control systems that potentially operate the electrical grid. 
Additionally, the attackers were able to download sensitive information to their remote 
command and control mainframe. “Most modern SCADA systems will at least contain the 
following peripherals: supervisory computers, remote terminal units (RTU), programmable 
logic controllers, communication infrastructure, and human-machine interfaces.”77 Even 
though the attackers were able to acquire unauthorized entry to SCADA systems, which 
gave them access to remotely control electrical production, transmission, and distribution, 
no service interruptions or outages were reported. 
Throughout the 2014 and 2017 attack campaigns, DragonFly used state-of-the-art 
malware specially developed to attack energy sector webpages in addition to email 
spoofing attacks targeting dozens of U.S. power companies. Given the perseverance and 
the advanced operations, it is problematic to attribute the cyber-attack to a source, since 
proxies, third parties, and fake artifacts in malware code are used to obfuscate their true 
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origin. Hackers imbedded strings of Russian and French coding, an attempt to elude 
authorities.78 
C. PLAN OF ATTACK—TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES 
Like the typical cyber-attack on a home computer, the Ukraine power grid attack 
started simple with company employees commonly receiving strings of phishing emails 
containing an attachment disguised with malware. This case is no different than a hacker 
tapping into a personal home network, except that it was performed on a grander scale. The 
key goal with the BlackEnergy malware was to steal user credentials for use months later 
to control breakers and manipulate the grid.79 These hacks not only required a high level 
of problem-solving skills to combine all the collected information, but a lot of patience. 
“The attackers then used stolen VPN credentials to reach the industrial control systems 
network, and remote access tools to control the human machine interface (HMI).”80 HMIs, 
in the simplest terms, are any software or device that permits a human to interact with 
physical equipment. This can be as simple and ubiquitous as our smartwatches and 
smartphones or as technically advanced as a multi-touch enabled control panel at a power 
plant. With remote control of the power grid, the Russian hackers were able to manipulate 
the control system to pull the substation breakers to cause the blackout. 
The hackers went to great lengths to hide their tracks and managed to buy 
themselves time by installing their own custom firmware. Russian hackers are experts at 
concealing participation in any state sponsored cyber-attacks. Additionally, the hackers 
waged a telephone denial-of-service attack against customer call centers, thwarting the 
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ability for customers to report the outage and providing the hackers with another 
smokescreen to go undetected.81 
The Russian government adamantly denies any participation in any of the staging 
hacks preceding the Ukrainian power grid cyber-attacks, regardless of evidence pointing 
to Russian affiliated hackers. The official Russian government posture about their role in 
cyber-space is that it only participates in defensive cyber security measures, which was 
confirmed in their doctrinal statement released in the latter half of 2011.82 Though the 
Kremlin claims to not participate in offensive cyber activities, it has become more obvious 
from other cyber-attacks against France, Germany, and Georgia that offensive practices 
have become conventional in Russian military operations and has most likely already been 
incorporated into their strategic deterrence agenda. 
D. KEEPING CYBER-ATTACKS ON THE POWER GRID IN 
PERSPECTIVE 
In retrospect, after all the details have been analyzed and released, it is obvious how 
the hackers were able to go undetected for so long only to be singled out after the cyber-
attacks took place. Nonetheless, it is an undertaking to understand what is going on within 
a power grid network if there are not enough adequately trained personnel or resources to 
detect abnormal activity. Also, if there is one takeaway the United States can learn from 
the Ukrainian attacks it is that if America succumbs to a similar attack, it will not be as 
easy as manually flipping Soviet era circuit breakers to restore power. Most of America’s 
industrial control systems have migrated to automated systems, which are limited to their 
programming and less versatile than a human performing a flexible variety of tasks like 
replacing a failed part. 
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Future attacks will most likely happen, so it is crucial power companies value the 
significance of protecting their assets against a cyber-attack, because doing nothing to 
prevent one will cost more than stopping one with cyber security measures in place.83 The 
impact of a power outage is typically measured in the amount of time power is restored, 
the impact it has on other critical infrastructures, and the number of electrical customers 
affected.84 According to the E-ISAC report on the Analysis of the Cyber-attack on the 
Ukrainian Power Grid, on a macro scale, the Ukrainian power outages have a low impact 
because of its short duration and the small populace actually affected by the outage. 
However, from a business and economic standpoint, any unexpected disruption to the 
normal operations would be rated critical or high in terms of dependability of their 
organizational system.85  
E. ANTICIPATORY RESPONSES 
All electric companies in the North American continent have been trying to 
decipher and take their own actions in lieu of the investigation reports and released data 
that headlined in Ukraine.86 The theme of what can be done to prevent and prepare for a 
catastrophic attack on the most important critical infrastructure has been brought to the 
attention of stakeholders in “Capitol Hill, trade associations, the Electricity Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and regulators.”87 Remote manipulation of the 
power grid by aggressive state actors is a real and troublesome fact and investors and U.S. 
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government officials need to take a step back and realize the United States is an optimal 
next target. 88 
The Russian hackers that targeted Ukrainian power facilities were not amateurs that 
happened to mistakenly stumble upon an unlocked computer. Russia has a reputation for 
having some of the world’s most talented and devious hackers, which was highlighted 
during the power grid cyber-attacks. These well-funded professional hackers planned their 
assault over many months, meticulously using every piece of illegally acquired information 
to their own advantage. The only way to bolster cyber security measures against hackers, 
is to think like a hacker. It only takes one mistake by a company employee or an unforeseen 
loophole in the newly installed data center software for a hacker to take advantage of these 
vulnerabilities. Hackers, whether Russian or another aggressive state actor, are in front of 
their computer screens constantly probing at a power grids defense. 
To beat a hacker, utility companies sometimes must think like a hacker. Power 
companies can engage in ethical hacker services against their own security services. Ethical 
hacking allows a computer professional to methodically break into a selected computer 
system to identify and fix system weaknesses.89 Better to find your own susceptibilities 
and repair them than have an aggressor exploit them. The entire process may seem 
counterintuitive. Although, there is no better way for a company to learn the intricacies of 
their own power grid if it is not broken into.  
F. STOPPING SCADA ATTACKS 
SCADA systems and their expanding advancements have developed unanticipated 
dangerous weaknesses that, if taken advantage of, can ultimately destroy or permanently 
hinder the proper operation of a segment or the entire U.S. power grid.90 Over 90% of 
electrical companies in the United States are investor-owned businesses that put a premium 
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on having low costs over the needs of cyber and physical security to maximize profit.91 
Because the majority of the electric sector offers company shares to the general public, the 
front of numerous investors’ minds is to maximize productivity, which in turn will 
maximize cash flow, and potentially hamper security concerns.92 However, even just 
enforcement of conventional best practices assists with mitigating a lot of the dangers 
presented by Dragonfly. Phishing emails is one of the most common practices used by 
hackers to obtain sensitive information. Targeting energy sector senior employees with 
malicious attachments is nothing new and likely to continue in the foreseeable future. 
Although, training and cognizance of suspicious emails will curtail the infection frequency. 
Two-factor or multi-factor authentication, an added layer of security that requires not only 
the username and password, but something that is unique to the user or a physical token is 
an additional way to verify trusted users.93 
SCADA systems at almost every scale perform well. However, as they incorporate 
more technology into them, they also increasingly integrate added open system architecture 
becoming networked, making them vulnerable to security risks.94 For instance, using TCP/
IP to communicate between the control center and remote equipment or among equipment 
in a substation.95 The advanced SCADA systems’ key attribute is its ability to perform a 
supervisory operation over a variety of other proprietary devices. Modern SCADA systems 
have evolved significantly, and because utility companies recognize the easier 
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accessibility, improved efficiency, and lower costs gained through connecting their TCP/
IP networks to their SCADA systems, it has opened themselves to the risk of tampering.96 
Dragonfly is proof that bold hackers have no limit and stop at nothing when trying 
to conduct cyber-espionage against the United States. 97 Symantec’s security response 
attack investigation team indicates that although successful cyber-attacks have been 
recorded throughout the globe, there is still no sufficient evidence that the U.S. power grid 
has been infiltrated and deliberately disrupted. Nonetheless, intelligence gathering for 
possible future attacks is expected. There is no need to dread the lights will shutoff anytime 
soon, yet electrical grid operators and managers must keep a keen eye on any abnormal 
trends.98 Cyber-attacks are frequently cast in the spotlight for a moment and the gravity of 
their breaches eventually fade until the catastrophe repeats itself. Prolonging to address 
cyber threats before they develop into a cyber-attack will leave cyber security experts in 
plight. 
DragonFly and other hacking groups with similar techniques and tactics will 
constantly evolve and continually innovate new attack methodologies to avoid detection.99 
According to Pierluigi Paganini, the electrical industry must be able to combat their 
adversaries’ tactics by having a cyber threat intelligence partnership with power grid 
regulators, sister companies, and the government because cyber-attacks that prey on the 
electrical grid will not fade away. According to the U.S. Federal Government, SCADA 
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systems are high value assets and the protection and resiliency of the data contained within 
the system is the responsibility of both the public and private organizations.100 
Dragonfly is undoubtedly a highly trained enemy, with the capability to jeopardize 
numerous organizations, unlawfully obtaining sensitive data, and gaining unauthorized 
access into critical systems. Though, it is still not fully known the extent of disruption 
Dragonfly were to cause if they decide to use the information they have acquired in a 
malicious manner, nor the actual scope of all the intelligence collection they have 
gathered.101 It is a loud wake-up call that almost any employee at an energy firm can fall 
victim to the phishing techniques’ devices that have evolved substantially since the early 
1990s. Businesses in critical sectors must determine and devote substantial effort to 
undertake the severe dangers posed by these types of attacks. Energy companies must 
function with the assumption they have already been hacked and that latent advanced 
persistent threats are lurking in their environment. 
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III. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT 
The United States Federal government in conjunction with electric power 
companies have spent the last decade developing sophisticated and versatile protection 
systems against cyber-attacks that have the potential to disturb United States electrical grid 
operations. Simultaneously, exposure to cyber vulnerabilities and subsequent risks have 
progressed. Network intrusions have drastically surged and the techniques in which they 
are carried out have evolved. Current cyber security measures in place may not be enough 
to provide reliant safeguards to face modern and arising threats. 
The dependency to the digital world and its accompanying dangers were at the 
forefront of national interests in the latter half of the 20th century. As we crossed into a new 
millennium, frantic United States companies and even FEMA prudently prepared for a 
potential Y2K emergency, fearing that computers would fail to distinguish the year 2000 
and cease to perform.102 Possible digital system disturbances were at the forefront of 
concern then and have existed since 1878, only a couple of years after the telephone was 
invented by Alexander Graham Bell when switchboards were hacked.103 On August 8, 
2005, Congress passed the U.S. Energy Policy Act of 2005 sanctioning construction of a 
self-regulatory electric reliability organization, encompassing the entire North American 
continent. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) would oversee the U.S. 
legislation that states compliance with reliability standards would be mandatory and 
enforceable. This gives FERC the authority and control of compulsory reliability standards 
to administer the country’s power grid. 
On March 2007, a test performed at the Idaho National Laboratory, named the 
Aurora Generator Test, measured the resiliency of a diesel generator running on a 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. The Department of Homeland 
Security employed hackers that were successful in exploiting the control systems’ 
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vulnerabilities to trigger the generator to self-destruct, leaving flying parts and smoke in 
its wake. DHS administrators silently repaired the unidentified susceptibilities; although, 
arguably just as important, the experiment brought attention to the new age of cyber 
warfare.104 
Though certain technological aspects within the power grid SCADA system require 
adjustments, as indicated in the Aurora Generator Test, transitioning to a more technology-
oriented power grid has more advantages than disadvantages. One of the most notable 
shifts that can be seen in the power sector is it has transitioned to information and 
communication technologies (ICT). ICT refers to the communications networks that 
connect all parts of the grid, including “operations, distribution, customers, service 
providers, and transmission by facilitating communications between humans, between 
machines, and between machines and humans.”105 ICT applications can comprise “load 
analysis and automated dispatch software, sensors for remote measuring, grid management 
systems, demand response software that allows automated load maintenance, smart meters, 
and chips and controllers for monitoring smart meters.”106 Though the capability to 
support both mission-critical and non-mission-critical data and operations has significant 
advantages, to include high operational performance and the capability for future 
development, the state-of-the-art technologies do not come without vulnerability 
drawbacks. 
Increased cyber-based incidents in the energy-critical infrastructure sector has 
multiplied signaling an opportune time to address these obstacles and implement new 
policies. In return, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), a non-
profit organization, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) a 
physical science laboratory and non-regulatory agency in the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, promulgate cyber security guidance and enforcement standards. “Through the 
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Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress created a hybrid system for setting electrical grid 
reliability and security standards; NERC and NIST, write power grid standards, while 
FERC, a government agency, reviews and approves NERC standards.”107 Their mission 
is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in the United States, Canada, and 
Mexico. Security standards aid utility companies to preserve a robust defense. NERC has 
a list of strict guidelines for electric companies to abide by which describe how to 
physically and electronically protect their systems that are intended to keep equipment to 
safely operate in the nation’s bulk electrical grid. These guidelines are better known as 
Critical Infrastructure Protection compliance.108 According to TechTarget, “NERC CIP 
consists of 9 standards and 45 requirements encompassing the security of electronic 
boundaries and defense of critical cyber assets as well as security management, personnel 
and training, and disaster recovery planning.”109 NIST have their own separate 
recommendations associated with organizing and advancement of smart grid standards and 
guidelines. Since NIST is a non-regulatory government agency, they only develop metrics, 
technology and standards on a voluntary basis that power grid engineers and executives 
can consider in their cyber security risk assessments.110 
A. DEFENSE IN DEPTH SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
When NERC formed in 2006 the viewpoint of critical infrastructure was it must be 
surrounded by an electronic security perimeter (ESP), bounding the entire critical asset 
network, physical and electronic, behind a monolithic border.111 The decade- old 
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philosophy is already obsolete. As such, it would be sufficient to protect the business 
network and the SCADA system within the confines of a single firewall with the 
expectation no critical assets would be unlawfully accessed.112 ESP standards is not a one- 
size-fits-all and the monolithic model allows a single link to be vulnerable, which fosters 
failure in what has developed into an intricate network. A “defense in depth” approach is 
a practical solution to secure a network’s critical infrastructure.113 Belden, an American 
manufacturer that designs and sells networking products, claims the need for multiple 
overlapping layers of defense throughout a network is because it mandates the need to have 
selected access to the tiers of a network. The defense in depth strategy continues to employ 
an ESP firewall between the business network and SCADA security system. Having 
additional protection within the control system defends substations in the event the primary 
firewall is circumvented. The concept is both security measures work in tandem, regularly 
extending over one another to provide redundancy, allowing a substantial amount of 
protection against human error or an intentional cyber-attack.114 
B. DEFENSE IN DEPTH STRATEGY ELEMENTS 
Defense in depth is not a single solution, but rather a combination of risk 
assessments, cyber security and network architecture, employee awareness, and security 
monitoring, incident planning, and response.115 Technology gives solutions for problems 
by giving us the tools to lower risk; nonetheless, the best technology created will never 
fully prevent human error. ICS are often managed via a SCADA system that provides a 
graphical user interface for operators to observe the status and manipulate a system.116 
Applying a defense in depth strategy in an ICS setting increases the “cost” to hack 
                                                 





115 Graham Williamson, “OT, ICS, SCADA – What’s the Difference?” KuppingerCole, last modified 
July 7, 2015, https://www.kuppingercole.com/blog/williamson/ot-ics-scada-whats-the-difference. 
116 Ibid. 
33 
simultaneously increasing defense and detection abilities from malicious operatives.117 
Decreasing the amount of chances an antagonist is able to successfully maneuver within 
any given power grid’s network or system is the objective. The following are a few of the 
recommended strategies and solutions that can be used collectively to form layers of 
defense.  
1. Risk Assessments 
Operating an electrical company faces risk like any other business and there must 
be a process in place to properly manage them, so an electrical company is not exposed to 
threats. Risk assessments are defined as “the process of identifying risks to organizational 
operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, other 
organizations, and the nation, resulting from the operation of an information system.”118 
Assessing risk mandates institutions recognize and classify their risks and susceptibly to 
them, the amount of damage these weaknesses can precipitate to an organization, and the 
probability that a detrimental catastrophe will probably happen.119 The risks associated 
with first generation SCADA systems were often overlooked because the systems were 
strictly isolated at the time, meaning was virtually impossible for an outside entity to 
penetrate the system. As second and third generation SCADA systems became more 
distributed and networked, hackers exploited security gaps of control systems linked to the 
internet. 
There are several approaches to risk assessment standards, protocols, and 
frameworks that administrators can practice within the energy sector. The most prominent 
of these standards are the NIST 800-82 that recommends established security and 
vulnerability testing methodologies be incorporated into SCADA/ICS. The other leading 
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document is NERC’s Vulnerability and Risk Assessment and critical infrastructure 
protection standards, which are mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 
Risk assessment is crucial in securing a SCADA/ICS sites against a security intrusion. 
Regrettably, risk assessment is filled with uncertainty such as the complexity of protocols 
and the frustration in determining breach repercussions. 
2. Cyber Security Network and Security Architecture 
Combining once-isolated ICS environments have certainly assisted in making the 
complex networks into a seamless and more manageable infrastructure. However, 
connecting the ICS networks and integrating information technology mechanisms with the 
ICS realm exposes vulnerabilities that electrical companies must address before severe 
issues arise. Some of the common ICS network architecture flaws are insecure connectivity 
to internal and external networks, a deficiency of competent understanding of requirements 
for ICS settings, and using technologies with identified vulnerabilities, generating 
previously concealed cyber risk in the control domain.120 
It was challenging to merge modern IT systems into an ICS setting that was 
previously isolated from an outside network that most likely lacked any security measures. 
To create a layered defense, IT administrators and operators need to have intimate 
knowledge of how every single piece of technology functions and how it interconnects 
within surrounding equipment.121 Dividing common control architectures into zones can 
assist a power grid’s SCADA architecture to produce distinct boundaries, locations of 
where multiple layers of defense can be applied. Some of the most common architectural 
zones that can be applied to an ICS is zone segmentation of a business and ICS systems.122 
Each zone performs together to accomplish the goal of linking the ICS network while 
securing communication pathways between trusted environments. According to Luciana 
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configuring the network’s routers, servers, and switches to be segregated via firewalls 
promotes the principle of least privilege, restricting user access based on their job, therefore 
producing subnetworks to reduce the surface area an attacker can work in if a layer is 
compromised. 
After an organization such as an electric company completes the construction of a 
solid network architecture, administrative controls must be implemented at the system, 
network, physical, and application levels to guarantee information security.123 These 
include but are not limited to data security, user security, platform security, application 
security, policy and security management, and perimeter security.124 These security 
architecture components work in unison, superimposing a network architecture and 
delineates the location of defense in depth measures within a system.  
3. Employee Awareness 
The largest factor to power grid ICS cyber-attacks are caused by unintentional 
actions by entry-level staff with basic network access to routinely do their job. Eight-four 
percent of cyber security intrusions are attributed to human error.125 Hackers find 
uninformed employees to be the most promising victims to conduct their targeted 
infiltrations that threaten normal operations of ICS, which have the potential to result in 
immense physical damage and disruptions. The most frequent types of cyber-attacks target 
ICS clients and exposed servers, which social engineering and spear-phishing tactics are 
taken advantage of because of a high rate user error.126 
A knowledgeable and attentive workforce does not guarantee industrial assets are 
fully protected, but it is one of the most inadequate and easily modified element to 
safeguard industrial assets from cyber-attacks and newly developed security threats. 
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Despite how far technology advances, a power grid’s network will continue to be 
susceptible if an employee is unable to distinguish a dangerous phishing link from a safe 
one. Cyber security awareness consequently needs to be elevated to the minimum standard 
of awareness parallel to compliance, safety, quality, and ethics. This mentality and way of 
thinking must be completely ingrained within the organizational psyche, reaching as low 
as an apprentice ready to be hired to as high as senior executives and boardroom 
members.127 
Conducting cyber security culture surveys within an organization is one of the most 
effective and economical components in a layered defense.128 This approach to 
information security tailors’ employee behavior and ultimately help promote a culture that 
highlights the importance of having a secure computer network. The survey initially begins 
with an evaluation of the institutions current security culture. As areas of security concerns 
are identified, companies can develop a plan of action that balance protecting a company’s 
sensitive data while allowing employees to productively do their job. Tailored training 
topics that align with concise computer network guidelines with the aim to alter the 
mindsets and routines of electric utility personnel will lead to organizational change. Cyber 
security education measurements can be taken periodically to determine which best 
practices in the workplace culture are effective and to identify any plan of action 
shortfalls.129 The cyber security deficiencies can then be addressed to shape the 
information security culture in a way that best suits the management of an electrical 
company and its customers.  
Training and awareness programs are essential in an ICS security program because 
it provides staff a clear understanding on the importance of information security and the 
expected behavior as a company employee to reduce security risks. A keen and well-
informed organization is the most valuable line of defense in safeguarding a power grid. 
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Even though security risks triggered because of human error will never be eliminated, 
raising awareness as well as recognition of ICS security, employees will enhance their 
comprehension of all the consequences derived from an incident and thus will be more 
prone to act in accordance with corporate guidelines that curb breaches. 
4. Security Monitoring, Incident Planning, and Response 
Overseeing a SCADA/ICS network for an irregular activity or signs of a possible 
attack is tedious and can be overwhelming. In the complex electrical grid environment, 
monitoring and detection services is an important aspect to defense in depth of defending 
critical assets. Simply having a border surrounding an ICS does not adequately defend 
critical assets from breaches. In a defense in depth architecture, a system must not only be 
able to protect from intrusion, but it must also alert an organization after intrusion so that 
it can take defensive measures to stop an attempted hack from success. Security monitoring 
is a universal term and can mean a plethora of different things depending on the sector that 
is being discussed. NIST SP 800-137 is the standard utility companies follow when 
applying a continuous security model into their risk management and strategies plan. The 
primary functions of this special publication are direction on how to establish and 
implement an effective security monitoring program, and how to analyze and respond to 
the results.130  
An all-inclusive incident response plan needs to be a key instrument in any ICS 
cyber security toolbox. Having an established incident response capability will make the 
handling of complexity of a computer security incident within the capacity of a trained 
workforce. NIST SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, gives cyber 
security experts instruction on how to evaluate data acquired from a breach and provides 
recommended follow-on procedures after an incident.131 Electrical companies are identical 
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to any other business that manage vital data in respect to data security breach liability. State 
jurisdictions that lack adequate cyber security laws that mandate how vital data and 
customer information is managed can still result in an electrical company to be held liable 
for any damages because of a cyber security breach, when the breach was reported, and if 
any actions were taken to reduce the impact of the breach. 
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IV. ASSESSING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
COLLABORATION 
As the United States physical infrastructure advances to digitization, cyber security 
has to be placed as a priority because of the mounting dangers facing the nation. Since the 
Reagan presidency when the first presidential directive on computer security was written, 
the nation has not emphasized cyber security enough as a top priority investment. Hackers 
attempting to access unauthorized control systems and networks have grown in scope and 
magnitude. Conversation about cyber security is making its way from talks in the basement 
to the situation room. It is no longer a subject to be taken lightly. 
The public and private energy sector stakeholders must determindely work together 
to avert cyber threats that have yet to be disovered and bring an end to the ones already 
known. It is a complex but important situation to create a cyber security structure that takes 
public and private interests into consideration. For a public and private relationship to be 
successful, crucial cyber security issues have to be addressed while taking business 
practices into consideration such as being able to stay competitive in the energy sector, 
providing an environment where company information is safeguarded but at the same time 
can be shared as necessary.132 
In order for cyber security professionals to fulfill their craving of having an 
advantage over emerging threats, an intelligence database for the entire electrical industries 
IT professionals to utilize is required. Combating the cyber threat has to change from 
reactiveness to proactivness. In just a couple of years, U.S. utility companies will spend 
approximately $7.25 billion on cyber security.133 Cyber security defense spending will 
certainly be expensive, but if the boundaries of public and private cooperation are not 
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crossed to pave the path for a reliable and safe national energy critical infrastructure, the 
estimated cost will drastically increase. 
A. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636 
Cyber security cannot just be a problem for Washington or for private corporations 
to face alone. For the public and private cyber security framework to foster growth and 
development while providing an appropriate level of protections to the energy 
infrastructure, a partnership must exist that promotes national cyber security strategies. 
These partnerships enable the Federal Government and the American public to recognize 
the importance of thwarting cyber security threats. Equally important in protecting the 
power grid from cyber-attacks is altering our mindset and archaic approaches. Cyber 
security executive orders signed by the President of the United States provide a nearly 
immediate precedent on cyber security compliance objectives. 
On February 12, 2013, former President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 
13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” provided all critical 
infrastructure companies a venue to report cyber threat information, which allows 
contractors access to a real-time Department of Homeland Security controlled database.134 
The participation by utility companies is on a voluntary basis but does provide quick access 
to classified cyber threat and technical information to companies that opt in.135 Private 
companies are primarily concerned about information sharing as a breach of their privacy 
and liability to their company. Anything that would ultimately reduce their bottom line is 
often frowned upon. Though Executive Order 13636 does not completely solve the cyber 
security problem, it provides additional protection to critical assets in the absence of 
inclusive cyber security legislation. 
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B. PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE-21 (PPD-21) 
The Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) was signed by former President 
Barack Obama the same day Executive Order 13636 was authorized and provides a concise 
framework for the presidential administration to secure the nation’s critical 
infrastructure.136 Not to be confused with an executive order, which must be “circulated 
to a general counsel or similar agency attorney as a matter of circulation accountability,” a 
PPD does not have a Federal Register publication requirement.137 According to Veronica 
Chinn, author of Information Sharing with the Private Sector, Executive Order 13636 and 
PPD-21 both focus on national security as a result of a deliberate cyber-attack, but there 
are variations in their method to protect against it. The goal of PPD-21 is to detect and stop 
cyber threats in their tracks, increase defenses, lower the number of susceptibilities, drop 
the number of cyber-attacks, and improve recovery.  
C. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13691 
“Executive Order 13691, Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing, builds upon the foundation established by Executive Order 13636 by encouraging 
the development of information sharing and analysis organizations (ISAOs) for cyber 
security information and collaboration within the private sector and between the private 
sector and government.”138 ISAOs are seemingly like extensions of ISACs that were 
implemented years prior to share cyber threat information among the private energy sector. 
The intent of Executive Order 13691 is to provide facilitation of real-time cyber-
information among the Federal government and the participants. 
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Like Executive Order 13636, information sharing is not required under Executive 
Order 13691, but rather highly encouraged. Former President Barack Obama declared the 
cyber threats against the nation’s critical infrastructure as a national emergency.139 The 
former President also made clear cyber security is inherently a public-private mission 
because most of the critical infrastructures in the nation are privately owned.140 Because 
Executive Order 13691 is not law, it does not provide an inclusive set of tools required to 
eliminate cyber threats, which would need to come from a bill introduced by Congress. 
D. ENHANCE INFORMATION SHARING 
Many utility companies in the United States hold the position that not sharing cyber 
threat information via some of the established outlets is necessary because it allows them 
to have the upper hand when it becomes necessary to respond to cyber-attacks on the 
electrical grid system. NERC operates the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (E-ISAC) whose primary mission is to be the principal organization that electricity 
providers can securely give and receive cyber threat information.141 The E-ISAC gathers 
and analyzes IT data, communicates mitigation tactics with stakeholders, and coordinates 
incident management with stakeholders within the electricity subsector with government 
partners, and across independent sectors.142 Regardless of its significance, all cyber 
security incidents can be reported to E-ISAC. 
Information sharing within the electric industry affiliates enables them to have the 
resources to determine who and what developing dangers are and allows E-ISAC to give 
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electricity representatives advanced notice of a possible network infiltration.143 When 
organizations share more and more information with E-ISAC, the data is compiled, 
analyzed, and distributed so that electrical organizations are able to make well-informed 
and educated decisions to lower cyber and physical risks on their systems. It is just as 
important for those working in the cyber and physical security realm in the electric industry 
to have precise and real-time information brought by information sharing via E-ISAC tools 
as it is for those who operate the SCADA systems to have real-time data on their networked 
data communications and graphical user interfaces, so they can also respond to system 
complications accordingly. The following are additional key benefits of information 
sharing besides the ability to compile information and provide analysis results for E-ISAC 
members: 
• Provides an environment for malware analysis where it can be reverse 
engineered to improve their understanding on how to counter an attack. 
• Strategic data is shared throughout the electrical sector, which in turn can 
create mitigating actions to prevent potential threats to perform malicious 
activities as well as lowering an organization’s cyber risk. 
• Information is shared with the other 19 members of the National Council 
of ISACs that help infrastructure owners and operators within the 16 
critical infrastructure sectors protect their physical assets, workers, and 
clients from cyber and physical dangers.144 With this, information can be 
shared with other critical infrastructure sectors to identify similar threat 
campaign tactics, techniques, and procedures.  
Electrical companies are straining to keep up with cyber threats that are 
outperforming their stove-piped cyber security defenses. Sharing information about cyber 
threats among trusted electricity stakeholders with the federal, state, and local governments 
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can shift the tide from a highly defensive posture to a vastly offensive position. Rather than 
fixing the damage conducted after a cyber-attack, a central information-sharing system will 
allow cyber analysis and developers to get ahead of the threat by piecing together a cyber 
threats intention and determine the tools they will likely use in their attack. 
Measures to improve security and resilience rely on timely and effective 
information sharing throughout the entire energy sector. The United States has the potential 
to effectively share cyber security information with the federal government and the entire 
private electrical industry and its partners alike. These energy sector partnerships have the 
organizational capacity and fortitude to develop a framework that establishes expected 
roles of each entity and how they are tasked to accomplish it145 
E.  BI-DIRECTIONAL INFORMATION SHARING 
The energy sector’s public divisions are unable to undertake the burden of financing 
and managing increasing energy demands alone; however, through the engagement of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs), each division can benefit through common interests of 
provisioning energy. Giving private companies the option to participate in PPPs allows 
both parties to share the benefits and responsibilities from these long-term contracts. The 
Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP) is a public-private partnership, 
co-founded by the Department of Energy and managed by NERC’s E-ISAC, the electrical 
industries’ leading cyberthreat sharing group.146 Through this collaboration, energy sector 
participants have access to a database that allows input and output of classified and 
unclassified threat data, a panoramic view of the nation’s grid security. The Department of 
Energy’s intelligence community facilitates data analysis that will ultimately boost a 
company’s cyber-defense capabilities in that they are able to develop better hardware and 
software to recognize and protect against their electrical systems. 
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The goal is to have all electric companies trust to use the CRISP technology; 
however, until the Federal Government finds a solution to subsidize the costs to run the 
program that will allow thousands of smaller electric companies to participate, about one 
quarter of the country will remain at a greater risk to cyber threats than the rest.147 
According to Peter Behr, an E&E News reporter, the larger corporate-sized U.S. electrical 
companies do not face any complications using the cyber threat information CRISP 
database because they have the budget and technical skills to take advantage of the 
program. The smaller municipal electric companies that are not participating in CRISP are 
not optimal targets for cyber-hackers nor pose a national threat if they were. However, if 
hackers were to successfully infiltrate even a rural town’s power plant that caused electrical 
disruptions to its small population, it would be a bitter loss for U.S. cyber-defense and 
would be exacerbated if there was physical damage. 
CRISP, like any other information sharing initiative, can pose more risks than 
rewards to private corporations. Private companies have had concerns that the E-ISAC 
shares cyber-intelligence information with its parent association, NERC. If an electrical 
company fails a baseline cyber security audit that NERC’s cyber security enforcement 
department conducted, it can put doubt into how the sensitive information is being used.148 
This fear or doubt may prevent utility companies from submitting their cyber security 
vulnerabilities to E-ISAC because it may come back to bite them later. Even though E-
ISAC cannot force utility companies to voluntarily divulge cyber security threat data, 
FERC and NERC have the capability to mandate it. This, however poses, the problem that 
utility companies may have less desire and motivation to find these threats. 
There must be a drive for companies to want to participate in programs like CRISP. 
It is not likely that all companies will voluntarily engage in information sharing even if it 
is valuable to its industry partners. Aside from the high costs associated with participating 
in CRISP, industry and government partners need to incentivize the program so that even 
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the small electric companies have interest in joining. Even the small guys want to ensure 
that they are getting something valuable in return for the information they share with E-
ISAC. There is certainly demand for cyber threat information by cyber security experts; 
however, the daunting task to find a practical solution that will balance costs and benefits 
may hinder forward progress. To expand CRISP’s membership base, E-ISAC must focus 
on the outliers—the companies not participating—and demonstrate to them the utility, 
quality, and impact of cyber security information sharing on a company’s overall security 
posture.149 Additionally, E-ISAC must be able to alleviate collaborative barriers that deter 
utility companies from joining. Examples are technological barriers, a lack in 
interoperability/compatibility among sharing organizations and firms as well as legal 
barriers that relate to companies thinking of legal repercussions from the release of personal 
identifiable information (PII).150 The goal is to double the number of CRISP participants 
by the start of fiscal year 2021. 
F. SUMMARY 
There is a paradigm of having too much or too little information sharing within the 
public and private sector. Not all private corporations find it necessary to share information 
and are more inclined to restrict them, especially after headlined events like WikiLeaks, 
wherein U.S. Army Private First-Class Manning publicly released thousands of 
intelligence reports, or the abundant number of U.S. Hospital Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPPA) data breaches. While it is certainly necessary to safeguard 
sensitive information, the solution is not to isolate information that can contribute to the 
energy industries’ cyber security. Any breach in sensitive information cannot ever be taken 
lightly; therefore, these occasions are reasons to enhance policies and procedures related 
to the access and flow of information. Private corporations that choose to not participate in 
cyber security programs established under Presidential Executive Orders 13636 and 13691 
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are hindering the dependency national security has on information sharing and those who 
rely on those contributions to protect the energy sector. 
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V. SAFEGUARDS AND MITIGATION 
Gas, water, and food supplies can be stockpiled in mass quantities; Although, that 
is not the case with energy. As energy is produced, it is immediately consumed, which 
makes for a tedious and meticulous balancing act because supply and demand is continually 
fluctuating. Electricity management in North America is a 24-hour-a-day operation that 
guarantees a consistent and dependable energy source supplying electricity to residential 
houses and companies. The complex electrical grid from generation, transmission, and 
distribution involves close collaboration between a multitude of North American energy 
organizations.151 
To be considered the largest interconnected machine on Earth, the United States’ 
electrical grid consists of more than 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, 5.5 
million miles of local distributed lines, millions more of digital controls, and thousands of 
energy-generating plants.152 The electricity grid is the most complex machine, composed 
of national power plants and regional facilities, moved across a network of substations, and 
transmission lines used to transport the energy to consumers across the country.153 
To date, there have been no known successful attacks to cause a blackout in North 
America; nonetheless, utility companies are constantly warding off thousands of attempts 
monthly. Jon Wellinghoff, an electrical grid expert and former Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission chair, believes that physical security should take a higher precedence than 
cyber-attacks.154 On the other hand, multiple utility executives believe the grid industry 
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must match the amount of money spent on cyber security defenses as is spent on natural 
disasters.155 Although grid cyber-attacks by single individuals, terrorists, and criminal 
organizations are not off the table, the chief threat that would require advanced skills and 
resources to cause considerably disastrous service interruption to the public population are 
state adversaries. The following discussed vulnerabilities are just some of the areas a 
mediocre hacker can exploit let alone a nation state actor with a cyber army aligned to the 
aims of their government.156 
A. ELECTRICAL GRID–SPECIFIC AREAS OF VULNERABILITY 
The United States electrical grid has had credible cyber-attack threats for at least 
two decades. It would not be impossible to effectively interrupt normal operations, but it 
would certainly be challenging because the grid has been built to be resilient, safe, and 
reliable.157 The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) 
categorizes the top three most susceptible areas to cyber threats within an electrical grid to 
be its control center, substation and communication infrastructure.158 
1. Control Center 
Inside a power grid’s control room is where power in its designated region is 
disbursed as well as where the mainframe is located that allows operators to observe grid 
stability. Modern power distribution control centers in the United States regulate daily 
services of the distribution network to provide continuous power supplies to the end 
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customers. A distribution operator manning a multiple monitor console can maintain 
control of the grid through fault, outage, and dynamic load management.159 
Part of the electrical grid hackers have most potential to gain administrative access 
to is located within its corporate management information system (MIS). These 
computerized records contain financial data, information systems applications, customer, 
and employee data that can be accessed at entry levels of management. Connecting an MIS 
to an energy management system (EMS), commonly referred to as SCADA, is particularly 
dangerous to network security because it can provide a portal into central operations of an 
electrical plant. EMS has an indispensable role in electric power systems control centers, 
because of their real-time SCADA applications that provide supervisory control and data 
acquisition including load shedding, data links, and control sequences.160 EMS can also 
provide dispatch and control and energy scheduling and accounting. EMS permits electric 
companies to improve their operation and maintenance of their transmission and sub-
transmission networks. However, it also has its shortcomings in that it is not a closed-loop 
system; it can connect to the internet or may connect to another utility whose LAN is 
connected to the internet, giving hackers an opportunity to venture into restricted space. 
Additionally, another danger can stem from a utility company’s remote administration and 
maintenance ports, that allow employees to login so that they may perform day-to-day 
administrative duties and/or remotely troubleshoot any issues.161 Not all EMS systems 
have advanced token-based authentication systems, leaving access to the dial-in 
administrative ports without this technology susceptible to malicious activity. 
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Substations, also known as terminal stations, integrate portions of the distribution 
and long-distance and short-distance electrical transmission systems. To minimize 
attenuation when electricity travels long distances, voltage is increased. Substations in turn 
will step down the electrical voltage so that it can be distributed to the consumer.162 
Likewise, substations perform the step-up in voltage when electricity is travelling in the 
opposite direction.163 Additionally, these high-voltage electric system facilities have the 
capability to move equipment, circuits/lines, and generators in and out of an electrical 
system. There are a variety of electrical substations based on their application, voltage 
grade, and by the physical make-up of the structure. Generally, substations will have these 
aggregate functions: 
• Provide measurement readings of electricity that is distributed to various 
termination points 
• Regulate voltage fluctuations and distribute electricity to end users 
• Change voltage level for transmission and distribution facilities referred to 
as step-up and step-down  
• Switching points where circuits can be isolated for maintenance 
• Reduce the number of electrical surges to the electrical grid and act as a 
lightning arrester 
• Protect vital equipment in the distribution system from short-and high-
circuit currents with the use of circuit breakers and fuses 
• Linking structure between one or more utility companies 
                                                 




• Load shed by reducing the electrical demand of equipment in parts of the 
distribution system to prevent entire system failure164 
a. Remote Terminal Units 
Substations are typically unmanned and are controlled using remote terminal units 
(RTU) and controllers for substation and power system automation, which are integrated 
into SCADA and energy management systems. An RTU is a microprocessor-controlled 
electronic device that links physical equipment such as a transformer or a breaker to a 
SCADA system. The RTUs and an assortment of other smart digitally programmable 
equipment such as programmable logic controllers (PLC) leave substations susceptible to 
hacking. 
RTUs, a serial-based piece of equipment, run on DNP3, which refers to 
“Distributed Network Protocol 3.0,” a communications protocol used to enhance 
administrative functions and information transmittal explicitly used in SCADA 
applications.165 It is the second most widely used protocol in SCADA/ICS systems within 
the electric utility sector because it works reliably over varied and low-quality media, it is 
resistant to EMI-induced distortion, and it is able to combine 65,000 devices in a single 
link.166 DNP3, however, was developed by Westronic Systems in 1993 when security was 
not the primary interest when developing computer protocols.167 
One of the traditional methods to exploit against DNP3 are DoS attacks, in which 
a targeted system’s bandwidth is overwhelmed with digital traffic, tying up valuable 
resources, preventing legitimate users from accessing a system with the intent of ultimately 
crashing the targeted computer or network.168 Man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) via the 
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DNP3 protocol can be used to inject false commands and responses within an RTU. This 
type of cyber-attack allows a malicious actor to impersonate communicating computer 
systems into thinking they are speaking to a legitimate node. Rather, the attacker can 
manipulate or even steal data between two communicating hosts and the theft may not be 
noticed until it is too late.169 
3. Communications Infrastructure 
The final segment where a multitude of security vulnerabilities persist is in the 
communications infrastructure, the part of the grid where control systems connect and 
exchange data. As the nation moves into having a fully automated smart grid, the 
communication infrastructure that controls signal and provides measurements and readings 
is supposed to be reliable and efficient. 
Communication technology is certainly an indispensable component for future 
smart grids; although, there are numerous hurdles the United States must face to have a 
highly defensed, robust, and operational effective smart grid network. The energy sector’s 
communication infrastructure, now commonly known as the smart grid, is composed of a 
complex network of networks, integrating both power and communications infrastructures. 
Communication networks in a power grid provide it with the necessary infrastructure that 
allows a utility company to manage all their equipment from a central location. The smart 
grid is a massive system that incorporates a multitude of communication and networking 
technologies to use with its applications. Some of the methods of communication are 
transmitted through copper cable, power line carrier, fiber optic cables, and wireless 
communications to include microwave, satellite, and cellular.170 Power plants and 
substations that operate traditional transmission systems opt for wired sensor technologies 
because they generally maintain a higher level of security and reliability over wireless 
communication. However, due to the high cost associated with wired communication 
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system installation and maintenance costs, the expense from an economic standpoint is a 
motivation utility companies elect to install wireless networks. 
a. Multi-hopping Networks 
The drawback of wireless communications is their limited range. To overcome this, 
intelligent communication systems such as SCADA can utilize multi-hop routing, in which 
a coverage area is larger than a node can transmit data, so the system uses nodes between 
itself and the destination as relays. Compared to wired networks, multi-hop networks can 
seamlessly extend range to remote areas without having to deploy cables and can enable 
faster data rates and higher output. Despite these benefits, multi-hop networks expose 
themselves to more cyber-attack risks because data is required to be transmitted on a hop-
by-hop basis.171 Every node in a multi-hop mesh network fundamentally acts as a router 
and therefore makes it another site for a potential cyber-attack. 
Multi-hopping networks, if not administered properly, are susceptible to black and 
gray wormholes in which a hacker disturbs a networks data routing path. If a node/
computer falls victim to malicious code, it can impersonate a trusted computer, and alter 
and/or disrupt data that moves through a network. In a gray wormhole attack, an attacker 
will filter what information can flow through the network. A single node or a collective set 
of nodes will selectively drop data packets.172 In contrast a blackhole attack is when an 
attacker uses the shortest path attraction to attract traffic, which will subsequently drop all 
the packets of data sent to the infected node.173 Wormhole attacks are relentless in that 
they can be simple to initiate although problematic to detect. 
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b. Wireless Sensor Networks 
Technology that is introduced into smart grids generally have the intention to 
advance its dependability and effectiveness but may simultaneously expose the smart grid 
to vulnerabilities if the newly developed service is installed without focusing on current 
and relevant security risks. Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have revolutionized the 
electrical power grid by incorporating cost-saving multifunctional sensors that accurately 
communicate atmospheric and physical environment data to control centers so that 
operators can make informed decisions. According to Piyush Ghune with the Malwa 
Institute of Technology, “harsh and complex electric-power-system environments pose 
great challenges in the reliability of WSN communications in smart-grid applications,” 
reasons that prevent its extensive placement into an electrical grid. 174 WSNs communicate 
on unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) radio frequency (RF) bands, which 
means they are shared in environments making sensor nodes susceptible to jamming 
attacks and eavesdropping. Jamming attacks are the most common type of attacks that 
jeopardize the integrity of WSNs. Radio jamming is the broadcast of a signal to one or 
more radio frequencies to stop radio communication, ultimately rendering equipment 
intended for monitoring, controlling, measuring, and fault diagnosis at various domains of 
a smart grid network useless.175 
“Defending WSN networks can be a complex undertaking due to the commodity 
nature of wireless technologies and an increasingly sophisticated user base means that 
adversaries are able to easily gain access to communications between sensor devices by 
purchasing their own device and running it in a monitor mode.”176 Unlike conventional 
DoS attacks as in Distributed Network Protocols 3.0 in remote terminal units in which a 
machine or network resource is flooded with superfluous requests to overload it, a jamming 
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attack takes advantage of using the same frequency used in smart grid equipment so that it 
will stop communicating within its network. 
B. A PATH FORWARD 
Smart grids have become the electric industry’s power grid standard of operation 
in the United States but not without a cost. Though the smart grid brings in a new era of 
reliability and efficiency with automation and high-tech digital sensors and operational 
controls that respond to electric demand, they inherently have their own risks. The 
responsibility for heading the way to modernize the nation’s electrical grid is the Office of 
Electricity (OE), a branch of the U.S. Department of Energy.177 OE oversees making sure 
the nation’s power grid system is secure, resilient, reliable, and ready for future use with 
micro-grids and electric vehicles. 
To address the lacking security measures in the control center, substation, and 
communication systems, OE should setup a comprehensive advanced grid research and 
development support activity with the collaboration of state and logical agencies. The 
activity should prioritize smart grid modernization. The program would have the purpose 
of building a reliable energy infrastructure that will be able to integrate the needs of the 
future. Grid modernization will ideally improve the physical framework of the electrical 
grid with new attributes, such as incorporating solar panels that have two-way directional 
flow of energy to and from an electrical grid. Through a grid modernization initiative, areas 
of vulnerability will be addressed as well.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The rapid change in technology combined with increasing demand for power 
continues to be a challenge for cyber security experts. The electrical grid since its inception 
has always been susceptible to physical threats. Cyber security experts are just now 
realizing the seriousness of the threat lurking in the digital world within the internet-
dependent power grid. Through case studies and research of this thesis, some of the most 
common power grid vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them painted a picture of reality—
a reality that is only a short reach away with the wrong intention. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary function of this thesis is to investigate and provide recommendations 
for enhanced cyber security of the U.S. power grid infrastructure. Key policy and 
procedural components require further development to better identify, analyze, and 
evaluate cyber risks, emphasized by the Russian attacks on Ukraine and western power 
grids. The three fundamental cyber security elements that require reinforcement to improve 
cyber security for critical energy infrastructure were identified as: security system 
robustness, joint public and private collaboration, and options to mitigate risk. 
The following are the policy recommendations that stem from the fundamental 
cyber security elements. First, today’s smart grid SCADA systems must use a defense in 
depth approach consisting of a layered defense model that allows the failure of a single 
security measure and allows data to continually be protected with additional security 
mechanisms. The systems and controls that make up the defense in depth architecture will 
work in harmony to maintain a robust architecture but can be adjusted to fight developing 
cyber security threats. Reliable service has always been a priority in the electrical business, 
but as cyber threats evolve, the systems and defense architecture that manage our electricity 
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must also evolve so the same reliable service is maintained. The defense in depth 
architecture must center on deterrence, resiliency, and restoration.178 
Next, the federal government must fund programs that increase incentives and 
decrease barriers as they relate to cyber threat information sharing. The paths for 
information sharing have existed for several years now. The Department of Homeland 
Security has developed many information sharing programs. One of the DHS flagship 
information sharing programs is the Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program 
(CISCP). This public and private information sharing network allows companies to provide 
other companies with any cyber threat, incident, and vulnerability information they face, 
and provides a collaborative environment where analysts can learn from each other’s cyber 
threats. There are six other information sharing programs like CICSP that are 
overshadowed by DHS, including CRISP run by E-ISAC. Ultimately, all these voluntary 
programs have similar agendas, -to create partnerships and to have a means to share 
valuable information companies can act on. 
Information is certainly flowing within the information sharing programs, but they 
are not at the elevated levels of private-sector participation—a blow to the Cybersecurity 
Act of 2015. This was legislation signed by former President Obama to establish a means 
for the federal government and the private-sector to share information while having certain 
legal protections. It seems like companies are eager to receive information but very few 
take the additional steps to give any back. The government does not make it easy to get 
into any information sharing program. To receive information from DHS’s automated 
indicator sharing program, companies must install unique technology, consent to data 
security agreements, and go through a clearance process.179 
Lastly, advanced grid research and development that focuses on grid modernization 
will prepare the nation for the needs of the 21st century and beyond. Modernizing an 
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electrical grid for the future is no simple task. To develop new transformational energy 
technologies to mitigate current and unforeseen risks will require assistance from multiple 
government agencies, private corporations, and even the energy customers. 
B. OTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
This examination of cyber security in the electrical grid represents a small cross-
section of the 15 other critical infrastructure sectors identified in the Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 (PPD-21). Furthermore, this study only provides a glimpse of recognized 
deficiencies in the physical and cyber security domain within the energy infrastructure. 
Furthermore, examining additional case studies might expose trends that cause cyber 
deterrence to succeed or fail in its implementation. 
Exploring the cyber security defense practices of alternate countries with well-
established critical infrastructures can possibly assist with molding a more effective policy 
to defend the United States. Besides a country’s technological capacity, other factors play 
a vital role in promoting cyber security awareness to include pertinent political legislation, 
economic strength, foreign policy, and building capacity. These represent vital aspects that 
will allow any government the ability to provide necessary protection against cyber-attack 
for all its electrical grid security participants. Researching alternative approaches to cyber 
security resilience in China, a country with a massive electrical grid infrastructure, could 
present practical alternatives for U.S. energy system resiliency, or at least promote new 
innovations 
Most of this study focused on cyber-attacks and cyber threats within the digital 
realm. However, protecting the power grid is a tactic that expands beyond the Internet of 
Things (IoT), defined as the concept of systems interconnected with sensors, computers, 
software, sensors, and practically anything electronic via the internet to move information 
around. Cyber security is certainly a topic that cannot be ignored, but as more focus is put 
on it, defense specialists cannot overlook the importance of physical security and what can 
be done to ensure its resiliency. The protection of physical equipment and structures in an 
asset-intensive industry tends to be ignored in organizations that are heavily reliant on 
technology. As previously suggested in this thesis, electric facilities are choke points 
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because they provide an enabling function for all other critical infrastructure sectors.180 
The threats are out there, and they have successfully attacked critical infrastructures. But 
the question is, how much is being done to protect the power grids’ physical perimeter? 
Since September 11, 2001, the thought of how to physically protect U.S. critical 
infrastructures and key assets has drastically changed. Words like “homeland,” “terrorist,” 
“ISIS,” and “jihad” have inundated our vocabulary; it has become common to substitute 
the word “if” with “when” to describe the next occurrence of a terrorist attack. The truth 
is, physical security threats to critical infrastructure, including the power grid, have not 
changed much since the 9/11 attacks, but there is now heightened awareness of its reality. 
The comprehensive definition of physical security is to design a robust system and its 
facilities to deter or mitigate the risk of an attack and be resilient if one were to happen.181 
In 2013, while the electrical industry had their focus on cyber threats, Pacific Gas and 
Electric’s Metcalf substation in Coyote, California was attacked by a well-orchestrated 
team of snipers that damaged 17 transformers.182 Even though several areas of the Silicon 
Valley, the world’s leading hub for technology, avoided losing power, the nation’s top 
electrical utility regulator referred to this incident as “the most significant incident of 
domestic terrorism involving the grid that has ever occurred.”183 Very little of the 
American public was made aware of this incident because most of the headlines were 
overwhelmed by the Boston Marathon terrorist bombings that occurred one day prior, 
while the Metcalf attack did not meet the FBI’s requirements to be considered a deliberate 
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terrorist act.184 Although this incident did not result in the aftermath of the 2003 Northeast 
blackout, the widespread power outage that affected large populations in the United States 
Midwest, Northeast, and parts of Canada, it is a stark reminder of some of the broader 
physical security problems the U.S. energy sector has yet to identify. 
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